Abstract Proof of retrievability (POR) is a technique for ensuring the integrity of data in outsourced storage services. In this paper, we address the construction of POR protocol on the standard model of interactive proof systems. We propose the first interactive POR scheme to prevent the fraudulence of prover and the leakage of verified data. We also give full proofs of soundness and zero-knowledge properties by constructing a polynomialtime rewindable knowledge extractor under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In particular, the verification process of this scheme requires a low, constant amount of overhead, which minimizes communication complexity.
Introduction
A proof of retrievability (POR) [1] is a cryptographic proof technique for a storage provider to prove that clients' data remain intact. In other words, the clients can fully retrieve their data and have confidence to use the recovered data. This highlights a strong need to seek an effective solution for checking whether their data have been tampered with or deleted without downloading the latest version of data. This technique is important for the storage-outsourced data, especially large files or achieves. For example, with a wide spread of cloud computing, cloud storage service has become a new profit growth point by providing a comparably low-cost, scalable, location-independent platform for managing clients' data. However, if such an important service is vulnerable to malicious attacks, it would bring irretrievable losses to the clients since their data and archives are stored into an uncertain storage pool outside the enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary for cloud service providers to make use of the POR technique to provide a secure management of their storage services.
Since a formal model for the proof of retrievability was introduced by Juels and Kaliski [1] , some schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] have been proposed in recent years. In these schemes, Shacham and Waters [6] proposed the compact proofs of retrievability (CPOR) schemes, considered as a representative work with a general archive files in widely-distributed storage systems.
Organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe some basic notations, common POR structure, and the attack for existing schemes. In section 3, we define a formal model of IPOR based on interactive proof systems. A practical ZK-POR scheme is proposed for the IPOR model in section 4. We describe the security analysis and performance evaluation of our scheme in section 5 and section 6, respectively. Finally, we conclude this paper in section 7.
Preliminaries
Let H = {H k } be a keyed hash family of functions H k : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n index by k ∈ K. We say that algorithm A has advantage in breaking the collision-resistance of H if
, where the probability is over the random choice of k ∈ K and the random bits of A. This hash function can be obtained from the hash function of BLS signatures [9] .
Definition 1 (Collision-resistant hash). A hash family H is (t, )-collision-resistant if no t-time adversary has advantage at least in breaking the collision-resistance of H. We set up our systems using bilinear pairings proposed by Boneh and Franklin [11] . Let G and G T be two multiplicative groups using elliptic curve conventions with large prime order p. The function e is a computable bilinear map e : G × G → G T with the following properties: for any G, H ∈ G and all a, b ∈ Z p , we have 1) bilinearity: e(G a , H b ) = e(G, H) ab ; 2) non-degeneracy: e(G, H) = 1 unless G or H = 1; and 3) computability: e(G, H) is efficiently computable.
Definition 2 (Bilinear map group system). A bilinear map group system is a tuple S = p, G, G T , e composed of the objects as described above.
Shacham and Waters [6] proposed a general CPOR model as follows: Given a file F , the client splits F into n blocks (m 1 , . . . , m n ) and each block m i is further split into s sectors (m i,1 , . . . , m i,s ) ∈ Z s p for some sufficiently large p. Let e : G × G → G T be a bilinear map, g be a generator of G, and H : {0, 1} * → G be the BLS hash. The secret key is sk = x ∈ R Z p and the public key is pk = (g, v = g x ). The client chooses s random u 1 , . . . , u s ∈ R G as the verification information t = (F n, u 1 , . . . , u s ), where F n is the file name. For each i ∈ [1, n] , the tag at the ith block is
On receiving query Q = {(i, v i )} i∈I for an index set I, the server computes and sends back σ
This scheme is not secure for the leakage of file information as follows: Attack 1. An adversary can get the file and tag information by running or wiretapping n times verification communication for a file with n × s sectors.
Proof.
Let s be the number of sectors in each block. After running or wiretapping n times queries, an adversary can get n times challenges (Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ) and their the responses ((σ (1) , μ
where 
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After s times solving these equations (i ∈ [1, s] ), the adversary can obtain the whole file, F = {m i,j } i∈ [1,n] j∈ [1,s] . Similarly, the adversary can get all tags σ 1 , . . . , σ n by using σ (1) , . . . , σ (n) . Denote the inverse matrix of
all the tags can be easily computed following the equations
3 Interactive proofs of retrievability
Definition
We present the definition of interactive proofs of retrievability (IPOR) based on interactive proof systems:
Defintion 3 (Interactive-POR). An interactive proof of retrievability scheme S is a collection of two algorithms and an interactive proof system, S = (K, T , P):
It takes a security parameter κ as input, and returns a secret key sk or a public-secret keypair (pk, sk);
T agGen(sk, F ): It takes as inputs the secret key sk and a file F , and returns the triples (ζ, ψ, σ), where ζ denotes the secret used to generate the verification tags, ψ is the set of public verification parameters u and index information χ, i.e., ψ = (u, χ); σ denotes the set of verification tags;
Proof (P, V ): It is a protocol of proof of retrievability between a prover (P) and a verifier (V). At the end of the protocol run, V returns {0|1}, where 1 means the file is correctly stored on the server. It includes two cases:
is a private proof, where P takes as input a file F and a set of tags σ, and V takes as input a secret key sk and a secret of tags ζ;
• P (F, σ), V (pk, ψ) is a public proof, where P takes as input a file F and a set of tags σ, and a public key pk and a set of public parameters ψ are the common input between P and V , where P (x) denotes the subject P holds the secret x and P, V (x) denotes both parties P and V share a common data x in a protocol. This is a more generalized model than existing POR models. Since the verification process can be considered as an interactive protocol, this definition is not limited to the specific steps of verification, including scale, sequence, and the number of moves in protocol, so it can provide greater convenience for the construction of protocol. Further, this paper will only consider the construction of public proof protocol.
Security requirements
According to the standard definition of interactive proof system proposed by Bellare and Goldreich [7] , the protocol Proof (P, V ) has two requirements: Definition 4 (Security of IPOR). A pair of interactive machines (P, V ) is called an available proof of retrievability for a file F if P is a (unbounded) probabilistic algorithm, V is a deterministic polynomialtime algorithm, and the following conditions hold for some polynomial p 1 (·), p 2 (·), and all κ ∈ N:
• Completeness: For every σ ∈ T agGen(sk, F ),
• Soundness: For every σ * ∈ T agGen(sk, F ), every interactive machine P * ,
where p 1 (·) and p 2 (·) are two polynomials, and κ is a security parameter used in KeyGen(1 κ ). In this definition, the function 1/p 1 (κ) is called completeness error, and the function 1/p 2 (κ) is called soundness error. For non-triviality, we require 1/p 1 (κ) + 1/p 2 (κ) 1 − 1/poly(κ).
The soundness means that it is infeasible to fool the verifier into accepting false statements. The soundness can also be regarded as a stricter notion of unforgeability for the file tags. Thus, the above definition means that the prover cannot forge the file tags or tamper with the data if soundness property holds.
In order to protect the confidentiality of checked data, we are more concerned about the leakage of private information in the verification process. It is easy to find that data blocks and their tags could be obtained by the verifier in some existing schemes. To solve this problem, we introduce zero-knowledge property into IPOR system, as follows:
Definition 5 (Zero-knowledge). An interactive proof of retrievability scheme is computational zero knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S * (called Simulator ) such that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, for every polynomial p(·), and for all sufficiently large κ, it holds that
where S * (pk, ψ) denotes the output of simulator S on common input (pk, ψ) and
denotes the output of interactive protocol between V * and P (F, σ) on common input (pk, ψ). That is, for all σ ∈ T agGen(sk, F ), the ensembles S * (pk, ψ) and P (F, σ), V * (pk, ψ) are computationally indistinguishable. Actually, zero-knowledge is a property that captures P 's robustness against attempts to gain knowledge by interacting with it. For the POR scheme, we make use of the zero-knowledge property to guarantee the security of data blocks and signature tags.
Definition 6 (ZK-POR
). An IPOR is called zero-knowledge proof of retrievability (ZK-POR) if the completeness, knowledge soundness, and zero-knowledge property hold.
Construction of zero-knowledge proofs of retrievability
In our construction, the verification protocol has a 3-move structure: commitment, challenge and response. This protocol is similar to Schnorr's Σ protocol [12] , which is a zero-knowledge proof system. We present our IPOR construction as follows:
be a bilinear map group system with randomly selected generators g, h ∈ R G, where G, G T are two groups of large prime order p, |p| = O(κ). Generate a collision-resistant hash function H k (·) and chooses two random α, β ∈ R Z p and computes H 1 = h α and H 2 = h β ∈ G. Thus, the secret key is sk = (α, β) and the public key is pk = (g, h, H 1 , H 2 ). and fills out the item χ i in χ for i ∈ [1, n] , where the index table χ = {χ i } i∈ [1,n] can be used to support some dynamic data operations, for example, we define χ i = (B i ||V i ||R i ) and initially set χ i = (
TagGen(sk,
is the sequence number of block, R i is the version number of updates for this block, and R i is a random integer to avoid collision. Then calculates its tag as
where ξ
. . , u s ) and outputs ζ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ s ), ψ = (u, χ) to a trusted third part (TTP), and σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) to a storage service provider (SSP).
Proof(P, V ):
This is a 3-move protocol between Prover (SSP) and Verifier (client) with the common input (pk, ψ), which is stored in a TTP as follows:
• Commitment (P → V ): P chooses a random γ ∈ R Z p and s integers λ j ∈ R Z p for j ∈ [1, s] , and sends theirs commitments C = (H 1 , π) to V , where 
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• Challenge (P ← V ): V chooses a random challenge set I of t indices along with t random coefficients v i ∈ Z * p , where t = |I|. Let Q = {(i, v i )} i∈I be the set of challenge index coefficient pairs. V sends Q to P .
• Response (P → V ): P calculates the response θ and μ as
where μ = {μ j } j∈ [1,s] . P sends θ = (σ , μ) to V .
Verification: Now the verifier V can check whether or not the response was correctly formed by
In order to prevent the leakage of the stored data and tags in the verification process, the secret data {m i,j } are protected by a random λ j ∈ Z p and the tags {σ i } are randomized by a γ ∈ Z p . Moreover, the values {λ j } and γ are protected by the simple commitment methods, i.e., H 
Security proof of construction
Our scheme is an efficient interactive proof system with completeness and soundness properties as follows:
(1) Completeness: for every available tag σ ∈ T agGen(sk, F ) and a random challenge Q = (i, v i ) i∈I , the completeness of protocol can be elaborated as follows:
There exists a trivial solution when v i = 0 for all i ∈ I. In this case, the above equation could not determine whether the processed file is available, because σ = 1, μ j = λ j , and π j = u μj j . Hence, the completeness of protocol holds
where t is the number of index coefficient pairs in Q. In fact, we require v i ∈ R Z * p . (2) Soundness: For every tag σ * ∈ T agGen(sk, F ), in order to prove the nonexistence of fraudulent P * , to the contrary, we make use of P * to construct a knowledge extractor M [7, 13] , which gets the common input (pk, ψ) and rewindable black-box accesses to the prover P * , and then attempts to break the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in G:
We have the following theorem: Lemma 1. Our IPOR scheme has (t, ) knowledge soundness in random oracle and rewindable knowledge extractor model assuming the (t, )-computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds in the group G for .
Proof. For some unavailable tags {σ * } ∈ T agGen(sk, F ), we assume that there exists an interactive machine P * that can pass verification with noticeable probability, that is, there exists a polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large κ's,
Using P * , we build a probabilistic algorithm M (called knowledge Extractor) that breaks the Computational Diffie-Hellman CDH problem in a cyclic group G ∈ S of order p. That is, given G,
The algorithm M is constructed by interacting with P * as follows:
Setup: M chooses a random r ∈ R Z p and sets
as the public key pk = (g, h, H 1 , H 2 ) , which is sent to P * .
Learning: given a file F = {m i,j } i∈ [1,n] j∈ [1,s] , M first chooses s random τ i ∈ R Z p and u i = G (1) in terms of the original scheme and generates the tag of each block, as follows:
• For each t i ∈ T , M chooses r i ∈ R Z p and sets ξ
• For each t i ∈ T , M uses r i and two random r i , ζ i ∈ R Z p to sets ξ
and
If the result is true, then
Hash queries: At any time, P * can query the hash function
while ensuring consistency, where k = t i or t i . 
Output: M chooses an index set
) from P * . M checks whether or not each response is an effective result by eq. (3). If it is true, then M completes a rewindable access to the prover P * as follows:
) or a special halting-symbol from P * .
If the response is not a halting-symbol, then M checks whether the response is effective by eq. (3),
= H 1 , and π ? = π . If they are true, then M computes 
where φ = It is obvious that we set α = a and β = b in the above construction. Since the tags σ ti are available for any t i ∈ T , the response in the first interaction satisfies the equation:
π · e(σ , h) = e i∈I (ξ (2) However, the values of {σ t i } are unavailable for all t i ∈ T . In the second interaction, we require that M can rewind the prover P * , i.e., the chosen parameters are the same in two protocol executions [7, 13] .
In above construction, this property ensures H 1 = H 1 , π = π , and for all i ∈ [1, s], 
